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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
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is accorded

the t r i a l court because the reasonable suspicion standard itself

they can "grapple witl i the i iiultitude of fact pattei ns that may

constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination."

Id. at 939-40.

In contrast, the trial court's findings of purely factual issues
that underlie its reasonable suspicion determination, such as
witness credibility and historical facts, are subject to reversal
only if clearly erroneous.
2.

Id.

at 93 9 n.4.

Was the warrant authorizing the search of

defendant's person supported by probable cause?
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis" for determining that probable cause existed.

State v.

Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Avala, 762 P.2d
1107, 1110 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
In conducting its examination, the reviewing court "should
consider a search warrant affidavit 'in its entirety and in a
common-sense fashion.'"

Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State

v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)); State v. Purser,
828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).

"Finally, the reviewing

court should pay 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision."
Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236 (1983)).
3.

Assuming the search warrant affidavit was for some

reason technically deficient, did the trial court properly admit

2

the evidence se:
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Amend IV:
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;;.. people to be secure in their
persons, ; :^ses; papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
• upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CAS? E
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a class £ misdemeanor.
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rr;. ...

record is numbered
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3

- **everse chronological c:

constitutional rights (R. 20, 33-34) . Following a hearing on the
matter, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 42-37
(Memorandum Decision), 49-44 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law)).
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea
to possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second
degree felony (R. 76, 74-69).

The remaining counts were

dismissed (R. 76). The trial court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of one to 15 years (R. 80-79).

The court

suspended execution of the prison term and placed defendant on a
36 month probationary term.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Search Warrant Affidavit

The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant
affidavit.2

The affidavit was submitted by Sergeant Mike

Blackhurst of the Pleasant Grove Police Department, an
experienced narcotics investigator (BR. 12-11) (see Addendum A ) ,
and had been reviewed by a county attorney (BR. 14) (see Addendum
A) .
Sergeant Blackhurst sought a warrant to search
defendant's and codefendant Blomquist's persons', defendant's
Corvette, and Blomquist's residence for "controlled substances,
paraphernalia# . . . buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other

2

The search warrant, affidavit and return are located in
the companion record of State v. Blomquist, Case No. 940369-CA at
(BR. 15-8) (copies are attached as Addendum A ) .
4

contraband associated with controlled substances" (BR. 13) (see
Addendum A ) .
The affidavit in support of the search warrant set
forth information gleaned over an approximate eight month period,
from September 1992 to March 11, 1993, when the search warrant
was issued.

Information was obtained from fellow officers,

confidential and anonymous informants, court records and
surveillance of Blomquist s residence.
1.

Confidential and Anonymous Informants

In September 1992, Detective Leavitt received
information from a confidential informant that Blomquist was
involved in the distribution of controlled substances (BR. 11)
(see Addendum A).

Detective Leavitt believed the information to

be reliable because the informant had supplied reliable
information concerning drug distribution on four previous
occasions.

Id.

Five months later, on January 28, 1993, Sergeant
Blackhurst received additional information from an anonymous
informant who reported that defendant "was driving to the Las
Vegas area in a [t]an and [b]rown Chevrolete [sic] Corvette
to pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to
[Blomquist]" (BR. 11) (see Addendum A).

According to the

anonymous informant, the "trips occur[red] approximately every
two weeks, and [defendant] carrie[d] a gun concealed in a
compartment behind her seat."

Id.

5

On March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst received
information from another anonymous informant who reported that
he/she had overheard Blomquist speaking on the telephone and that
Blomquist had stated that defendant "would be delivering a load
within the next five to six days" (BR. 11) (see Addendum A ) .
2.

Investigation and Surveillance

Police confirmed that a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette with a
Nevada State license plate was registered to defendant (BR. 9)
(see Addendum A).

Police then began a periodic surveillance of

Blomquist's residence on March 4, 1993 (BR. 10) (see Addendum A ) .
Defendant's Corvette was not observed at Blomquist's residence on
that date; however, the Corvette was observed at Blomquist's
residence on March 11, 1994, within 24 hours of her estimated
time of arrival.

Id.

Additionally, during the period of surveillance a
vehicle registered to Linda lorg was observed at Blomquist's
residence (BR. 10) (see Addendum A).

Sergeant Fox recalled that

he had previously executed a search warrant at the lorg residence
in 1989 and that Iorg's son had been charged with several counts
of distribution of controlled substances as a result of that
search.

Id.
3•

Corroborative Criminal Histories

The affidavit also set forth the defendants' criminal
histories.

Defendant's criminal history revealed that she had

been charged but not convicted for controlled substances
violations in 1988 and 1989 (BR. 10) (see Addendum A ) .

6

Blomquist's criminal history revealed a drug related conviction
in March 1984.

Further, there was a misdemeanor warrant for

Blomquist's arrest out of Pleasant Grove City Court.
B.

Id.

Pre-warrant Stop and Detention

On the basis of the foregoing, Sergeant Blackhurst
sought a search warrant on the morning of March 11, 1993 (BR. 1413) (see Addendum A).

Prior to the warrant's issuance, at

approximately 9:00 a.m., police began surveillance of Blomquist's
house which was to continue up until Sergeant Blackhurst returned
with the signed search warrant (Tr. Aug. 26, 1993 at 37, 50). 3
While police were watching the house, at approximately 10:30
a.m., defendants were observed leaving the house and driving off
in Blomquist's pickup truck (Tr. 6).
When notified of the defendants' activity, Sergeant
Blackhurst told the surveilling officers to stop them (Tr. 50).
He further instructed that no action should be taken with regard
to defendant until the search warrant was signed (Tr. 37).
Accordingly, a marked patrol car stopped Blomquist's pickup
shortly after it left a nearby convenience store (Tr. 7).
Blomquist, who was driving the pickup, was immediately
asked to step out of the pickup and was arrested on the
outstanding misdemeanor warrant (Tr. 8). Defendant was similarly
requested to exit the pickup and was detained approximately five
minutes until police confirmed that the search warrant had been
3

The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped
with record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to
the internal page numbers.
7

signed (Tr. 8, 15). Because they were awaiting the search
warrant at the time of the stop, several officers responded to
assist (Tr. 13). Three police vehicles were present, the marked
car effecting the stop and two unmarked cars.

No guns were drawn

during the course of the stop (Tr. 14).
Moments after the initial stop, Sergeant Blackhurst
notified Officer Cullimore, who assisted in the stop, that the
search warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 16, 38). 4 He further
instructed Officer Cullimore that defendants should be
transported to the jail and searched (Tr. 8). Sergeant
Blackhurst then proceeded directly to Blomquist's house with the
search warrant where he arrived in the next 10-15 minutes (Tr.
39, 41, 51). Officer Harris, who was waiting at the house, noted
that they had the search warrant in hand, at Blomquist's house,
by 11:39 a.m. (Tr. 29-30).
C. Search Results
In the meantime, defendants' were transported and
searched at the jail.

No evidence was seized directly from

either defendant's person; however, a search of defendant's purse
revealed methamphetamine (Tr. 18). The search of Blomquist's

4

On signing the search warrant, Judge Dimick noted the
time as 11:30 a.m. (BR. 8) (see Addendum A). Sergeant Blackhurst
did not note the exact time the warrant was signed, but based on
his memory of the sequence of events, believed the judge was
mistaken in his notation of the time (Tr. 41). In any event,
Sergeant Blackhurst did not advise Officer Cullimore to take
defendant in for questioning until after the search warrant had
been signed (Tr. 43). Officer Cullimore noted that Sergeant
Blackhurst contacted and notified him that the warrant had been
signed prior to 11:00 a.m. (Tr. 16) .
8

residence turned up numerous items of drug paraphernalia, pills,
leafy and seed marijuana and cocaine crystals and residue.

Drug

paraphernalia was similarly seized from defendant's Corvette (BR.
15) (see Addendum A)•
D.

Motion to Suppress

Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the
ground that the search warrant lacked probable cause in violation
of federal and state constitutional provisions (R. 20, 33-34) .
In a supporting memorandum, defendants asserted the" the
affidavit failed to demonstrate the reliability or

one

confidential and two anonymous informants; that the iniwrmation
was stale; and that the criminal histories of the defendants were
irrelevant (R. 27-23).

In argument before the trial court,

defense counsel focused primarily on the legality of the
officer's detention of defendant (Tr. 61-63) .
E.

Denial of Motion to Suppress

The trial court denied defendants' motion on September
15, 1993 (R. 42-37 (Memorandum Decision)).

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law were filed on October 14, 1993 (R. 49-44).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the
Narcotics Enforcement Team received
information from a trusted and reliable
confidential informant that Defendant Roger
Blomquist was involved in the distribution
and use of controlled substances.
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous
informant provided information that Linda
Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist,
was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown
Chevrolet Corvette to obtain controlled
9

substances to deliver back to Roger
Blomquist.
3. The anonymous informant said the trips
occurred every two weeks and that Edenfield
carried a gun concealed in a compartment
behind her seat.
4. In March of 1993, officers received
information from a third informant who
claimed to have overheard a telephone
2conversation in which Blomquist stated that
Edenfield would be delivering a load within
the next five to six days.
5. After receiving the information on March
4, 1993, officers began surveillance of the
residence of Blomquist and discovered that
the tan and brown Corvette was not at the
residence.
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until
March 10, 1993. During the period of
surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda
Iorg was seen parked at the home.
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of
controlled substances in 1989.5 Roger
Blomquist was also found to have had a
criminal record involving controlled
substances with a conviction in March 1984.
8. Officers determined that an active
warrant for the arrest of Roger Blomquist
existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court.
9. The name Linda Edenfield was also checked
and it was determined that there were several
narcotics related
convictions appearing on
the record.6

5

The Court's finding is inaccurate. Linda Iorg's home
was the subject of a search warrant in 1989. Following the
search, Linda Iorg's son was arrested on several drug related
charges (BR. 10) (see Addendum A ) .
6

The Court's finding is inaccurate. The affidavit makes
clear that codefendant had several controlled substance related
arrests, but no convictions (BR. 10) (see Addendum A ) .
10

10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada
license number 693EPS was registered to Linda
Edenfield.
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the
information obtained by the officers was put
together in an affidavit and taken to Judge
Dimick of the Orem Circuit Court who executed
a search warrant authorizing [a] search of
the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette
registered to Linda Edenfield, the person of
Linda Edenfield, and the person of Roger
Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and
affidavit are attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced
surveillance of the Blomquist residence.
Officer Blackhurst was in the process of
acquiring the search warrant described above.
While the Blomquist residence was under
surveillance the [d]efendants, Linda
Edenfield and Roger Blomquist, left the
residence and entered a vehicle owned by
[d]efendant Blomquist.
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped
sometime around 10:30 a.m. Blomquist was
arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was
detained briefly until officers received
information that the search warrant had been
signed.
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to
the Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield
was searched pursuant to the warrant.
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the
Edenfield vehicle were searched until the
search warrant was appropriately executed by
Judge Dimick.
16. The purse of Defendant Edenfield was
with her when the vehicle was stopped and
taken with her to the police station. The
purse was part of her person and
appropriately searched pursuant to the search
warrant.
17. The stop of Roger Blomquist and the
execution of the arrest warrant and execution
11

of the search warrant were essentially
contemporaneous.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Under the totality of the circumstances
analysis the facts as established in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant
established adequate probable cause to
support the search warrant issued.
Information from separate sources was
corroborative and consistent providing a
sufficient basis for the magistrate to
conclude that there was fair probability that
the evidence sought would be found in the
car, in the house, or on the person of the
individuals described.
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the
temporary detention of the [d] efendants prior
to the physical arrival of the search warrant
was appropriate because of the mobility of
the [d]efendants and the likelihood that they
may have had evidence upon their person.
3. All officers involved in this operation
acted in a good faith attempt to comply with
the Rules of Evidence and Constitution of the
United States. Officers acted reasonably and
prudently to prevent the loss or destruction
of expected evidence without inappropriate
intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects.
4. The initial seizure of the person of
Linda Edenfield was lawful under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
5. The method employed by the officers was
reasonable and employed in a reasonable
manner in that the officers had an obvious
and legitimate concern when the suspects left
the home and entered a vehicle that evidence
would leave with them. The immediate stop
and detention without further search until
they had received information that the search
warrant being sought at the present time was
executed was appropriate. No lesser
intrusion would have preserved the evidence.
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No more intrusive action was undertaken until
the fact that the warrant had been signed was
confirmed.
6. Police officers had received a valid
search warrant based upon evidence
independent of the stop and detention of
Edenfield. Even if the search took place
before the warrant was obtained the fact that
a warrant was obtained made discovery of the
evidence inevitable and the evidence should
not be suppressed even if it were to be
determined by this Court that the search took
place before execution of the warrant.
Id. (a copy is attached as Addendum B ) .
Defendants filed objections to the court's findings
essentially re-arguing the basis of their motion to suppress (R.
61-56), and filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling (R.
61.7-61.1)# based on State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App.
1993).

The trial court denied defendants' motion on November 2,

1993, on the ground that Potter had not altered existing law
regarding the issuance of search warrants (R. 64) (a copy is
attached as Addendum C).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's brief detention after police stopped the
pickup truck in which she was riding as a passenger was based on
at least a reasonable suspicion of her involvement in a drug
trafficking scheme.

Therefore, her detention was

constitutionally justified.

Further, defendant's approximate

five minute detention facilitated the well recognized judicial
preference for warrant-supported searches by allowing police to
maintain the status quo and to preserve the suspected contraband
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while awaiting confirmation that a search warrant for defendant's
person had in fact been issued.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant
Blackhurst's affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the
magistrate to determine that there was current probable cause to
search defendant's person for evidence of drug trafficking.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

Three independent

informants implicated defendant and Blomquist in a drug
trafficking scheme involving defendant's transportation of
controlled substances from Nevada to Utah in her Corvette.

This

information was corroborated by independent police investigation
including police observation of defendant's suspected delivery of
controlled substances in her Corvette to Blomquist's residence on
the very day the search warrant was sought and obtained.
Notwithstanding, should the Court conclude that
probable cause to search defendant's person and Corvette was not
clearly articulated, any defect in the affidavit is not so
obvious that the police "had no reasonable grounds for believing
that the warrant was properly issued."
468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).

United States v. Leon,

None of the facial deficiencies that

negate objective good faith exist here. Nor is this a case
wherein the issuing magistrate was mislead by knowingly or
recklessly false information. Accordingly, police reliance on
the warrant issued was objectively reasonable, and the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding
the challenged evidence.
14

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, PRE-WARRANT DETENTION WAS
REASONABLE AND PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Propriety of Vehicle Stop and Defendant's
Allegation of a Warrantless Search Are Not
Properly Before the Court
At the outset of the State's analysis it is necessary
to clarify which issues are properly before the Court.

In Point

II of her brief, defendant's primary challenge is to the
propriety of her brief detention while police awaited
confirmation that a search warrant for her person7 had been
obtained.

Br. of App. at 25. The heading of defendant's Point

II appears to also challenge the validity of the initial stop of
codefendant's truck in which defendant was riding as a passenger.
Br. of App. at 25. However, codefendant Blomquist conceded the
validity of the stop as applied to him in his brief on appeal,
recognizing that the outstanding warrant for his arrest
constituted at least one proper ground for the stop.

Br. of

Blomquist at 27. Defense counsel, who represents both
codefendant and defendant, has filed identical briefs in each
defendant's appeal, compare Br. of App. at 27 with Br. of
Blomquist at 27, and has not developed a separate argument
alleging that the initial stop was nonetheless improper as

7

Although contraband was also seized from defendant's
Corvette, criminal charges based on that seizure were dismissed
pursuant to the plea bargain agreement (R. 76).
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applied to defendant.

Id.

Accordingly, the State's analysis

assumes the validity of the initial stop.
As for defendant's further contention both in the
heading and body of her Point II, that her person was searched
prior to the warrant's issuance, Br. of App. at 26, it is
contrary to the trial court's written findings and is also
improperly before the Court.

The trial court found that

defendant "was detained briefly until officers received
information that the search warrant had been signed," and that
defendant "was searched pursuant to the warrant" (R. 47) (see
Addendum B ) . Defendant has not the challenged the court's
findings as clearly erroneous.
475-76 (Utah 1990).

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,

Specifically, defendant has neither

marshalled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings,
nor demonstrated how it is insufficient.

Id.; State v. Drobel.

815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of
fact on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show
that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).

Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's

attempt to characterize the search of her person as a warrantless
search and must instead assume the correctness of the trial
court's historical findings.

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490

(Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865
P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).

The State's analysis of the
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warrant-

supported

search of defendant's person is found in Points II-III,

infra.
Turning to the merits of the detention issue, defendant
cites State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) for the
proposition that police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
her, a passenger in the stopped vehicle, beyond their apparent
purpose in arresting codefendant, the driver.

Br. of App. at 27.

Defendant's reliance on Johnson is misplaced and overlooks the
officers' reasonable suspicion of both defendant's and
Blomquist's involvement in a drug trafficking scheme.
B.

State v, Johnson Distinguished

Although the defendant in Johnson was also a passenger
in a stopped vehicle, the similarity between the two cases ends
there.

Unlike the present case, Johnson dealt with a vehicle

stop based upon the officer's observation of faulty brake lights,
a traffic violation.

805 P.2d at 762. Under that circumstance,

the supreme court held that an officer "%may briefly detain the
vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle
registration and the driver's license.'ff

Id. at 763 (quoting

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989)).

The

supreme court further reiterated that the "length and scope of
the detention must be

%lf

'strictly tied to and justified by'11 the

circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'"
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

Id.

Ultimately, the

supreme court determined that Johnson was improperly detained
because the officer developed no reasonable suspicion of her
17

criminality during the course of the traffic stop.

Specifically,

the supreme court held that Johnson's detention "was beyond what
was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop" and was also
"not justified by an articulable suspicion that [Johnson] had
committed a crime."

Id. at 764. See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d

431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) ("Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose
for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth
amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity.").
In contrast, the initial stop of Blomquist's truck was
based, in part, on at least a reasonable suspicion of both
Blomquist's and defendant's involvement in a drug trafficking
scheme.

See Statement of The Facts, pp. 5-7 supra.

See also

State v. Hiqgjns, 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1992) ("[The stopping
of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is
based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an
occupant of the vehicle has committed or is about to commit a
crime.11), cert, granted, 857 P. 2d 948 (Utah 1993), aff 'd. State
v. Hjqcrins, No. 920494 (Utah November 10, 1994) . Indeed, based
on information available to police at the time of the stop,
Sergeant Blackhurst ultimately obtained a search warrant for both
defendants' persons, Blomquist's house and defendant's Corvette.
See Statement of The Facts, pp. 7-8 supra. Accordingly, police
were justified in detaining defendant, even apart from any
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purpose they may have had in arresting Blomquist on the unrelated
misdemeanor warrant.
C.

Hicrains. 837 P.2d at 11.

Detention Reasonable and Appropriate

Further, the scope of defendant's brief detention was
reasonable and consistent with principles of fourth amendment
law, particularly the strong preference for warrant-supported
searches, which was facilitated here.
U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

Illinois v. Gates, 462

As recognized by the United States Supreme

Court, some
seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth
Amendment constitute such limited intrusions
on the personal security of those detained
and are justified by such substantial law
enforcement interests that they may be made
on less than probable cause, so long as
police have an articulable basis for
suspecting criminal activity.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981).
The Summers Court held that a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted.

452 U.S. at 705. Accord

State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) (approving
suspects' restraint by handcuffing during execution of search
warrant "to prevent [suspect] from secreting contraband and to
preserve the premises during the search.").

It follows that it

was similarly reasonable and appropriate, under the circumstances
here, to briefly detain defendant pending confirmation that the
search warrant had been signed.

Cf. State v. South. Case No.

930362-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah App. November 1, 1994)
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(affirmatively noting that police can secure a home while a
search warrant is obtained).

See also United States v. Van

Leeuwen. 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (29 hour detention of mailed
packages for purposes of obtaining a search warrant held prudent
and reasonable under the fourth amendment).8
Moreover, given the officers' reasonable suspicion that
defendant had just delivered a load of controlled substances to
Blomquist's residence, there was substantial law enforcement
interest in preventing either defendant from returning to
Blomquist's residence prior to the warrant's issuance and the
trial court so ruled (R. 46) (see Addendum B).

Specifically,

police had a substantial interest in maintaining the status quo
and in preserving contraband they anticipated finding on
defendants' persons, and on the premises.

See Adams v. Williams,

407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("A brief stop of a suspicious
individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain

status

quo momentarily

while obtaining

more information,

the

may be

most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time." (emphasis added)).

See also State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d

1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) ("When a police officer sees or hears
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only
the right but the duty to make observations and investigations to
•
But see Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980)
(noting that legality of temporarily detaining a person at the
scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant may
be an open question and then assuming for purposes of analysis
that the suspect's 45 minute detention while police obtained a
search warrant was error, but error did not constitute either
flagrant or purposeful misconduct).
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determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to

such measures as are necessary

in the enforcement

of the

(emphasis added)), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).

take

law."

The

brevity of defendant's pre-warrant detention further illustrates
the reasonable and even exemplary police conduct in this case.
State v. Ficrueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992)
(fact that entire pre-arrest detention lasted less than three
minutes held a further indication of reasonableness).
POINT II
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FCR THE MAGISTRATE'S
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
The magistrate had a substantial basis for determining
that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search
warrant for defendant's person and Corvette.

The affidavit was

not rendered inadequate due to allegedly unreliable and stale
information.9

Quite the contrary, the affidavit set forth

9

Defendant broadly asserts that the instant warrant was
an "anticipatory warrant." Br. of App. at 18-19, relying
primarily on United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir.
1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). Garcia defines an
anticipatory warrant as "a warrant that has been issued before
the necessary events have occurred which will allow a
constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not
transpire, the warrant is void." 882 F.2d at 702. Cf. State v.
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111-12 (Utah 1985) (discussing propriety of
a preprepared affidavit). However, the present facts do not
support defendant's claim; rather, all of the events set forth in
Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit occurred prior to the affidavit's
presentation to Judge L ~ ick (BR. 15-8) (see addendum A ) .
Consequently, defendant nas not and cannot show that the instant
warrant was in any way an "anticipatory warrant." Accordingly,
the State responds solely to defendant's allegations concerning
the adequacy of probable cause.
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mutually reinforcing allegations obtained from one confidential
informant and two anonymous informants, as well as corroborative
information gained through independent police investigation.
A.

Informant Reliability

An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists.
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983).

See

However, "[t] hey

are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly
extracted' in every case."

State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130

(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their
significance varies under the circumstances of each case.
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203,
1205 (Utah 1984)).

For example, "if the circumstances as a whole

demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less
strong showing is required."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Such a

circumstance is found when corroborative information is provided
by multiple confidential informants.

Even if an individual

informant's information is inadequate by itself to establish
probable cause, it may nonetheless help to establish probable
cause when corroborated by additional independent sources.
v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993).
1. Three Independent and Corroborative
Sources
Accordingly, it is significant that three separate
informants supplied information appearing in the present
22

State

affidavit and that the information was mutually reinforcing and
corroborative.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)

("Corroboration through other sources of information reduce[s]
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale"),10 overruled
on other grounds, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

Specifically, while the

confidential informant simply reported that Blomquist was
involved in drug trafficking, the anonymous informants
corroborated that information with details implicating defendant
in the scheme.

The first anonymous informant reported that

defendant made biweekly drug runs to Las Vegas in her Corvette
and the second anonymous informant reported the approximate date
of defendant's delivery of the next "load" of controlled
substances (BR. 11) (see Addendum A ) . Due to the interlocking
nature of the tips, the issuing magistrate reasonably relied upon
all three reports in his probable cause determination. Id.
2. Informant's Provided Nothing in Exchange
for Information
Notwithstanding corroboration between the three
reports, the reliability and/or basis of knowledge of the
informants is otherwise demonstrated.

For example, the

informants did not receive anything in exchange for their

10

See also United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 103 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("fact that two apparently unassociated persons make
the same assertion increases the probability that it is true");
United States v. Landis, 726 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Interlocking tips from different confidential informants
enhance the credibility of each."), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230
(1984); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1978)
("When three unreliable but unconnected persons all report the
same fact, it is probable that the fact is true.")
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information.

This Court has previously recognized that when a

confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is
reliable.

State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994).

Cf. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 ("reliability and veracity are
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from the police in exchange for the information").
3.

Confidential Informant Previously Reliable

Referring particularly to the reliability of the
confidential informant, his/her reliability is established by the
fact that he\she had provided reliable information on four
previous occasions.

Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; State v. Anderton,

668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983) (indicating an informant has
previously provided truthful information is an accepted method
for establishing veracity).
4.

Anonymous Informants Provided Insider Details

Additionally, the reliability of the anonymous
informants is enhanced by the insider nature of their
information.

The first anonymous informant was able to supply

details of the drug trafficking scheme including a description of
defendant's Corvette, the frequency and purpose of her drug runs
to Las Vegas, and her ultimate delivery of the controlled
substances to Blomquist's residence (BR. 11) (see Addendum A ) .
The informant's knowledge of defendant's travel habits reasonably
suggests that the information was obtained either from defendant
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or from someone defendant trusted and was therefore reliable.11
Gates, 462 U.S. at 245; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
The same can be said for information reported by the
second anonymous informant who personally overheard Blomquist
state when he expected defendant to deliver the next "load."
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (informant's personal observation of
criminality is adequate to establish basis of knowledge).
B. Independent Verification and
Corroboration of Significant Facts
1.

Police Investigation and Surveillance

Informant reliability is also enhanced by independent
police investigation and corroboration of significant facts.
Bailev, 675 P.2d at 1206; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

In the

present case, police verified that the described Corvette was in
fact registered to defendant (BR. 9) (see Addendum A).

Police

also observed the Corvette at Blomquist's residence within 24
hours of its estimated arrival time (BR. 10) (see Addendum A ) .
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be right
about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he
11

Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Sergeant Blackhurst
testified that he later found out that the first anonymous
informant was defendant's ex-boyfriend (Tr. 46-47). He explained
that this information was not included in the affidavit because
it was not known at that time the affidavit was prepared. Id.
On appeal, defendant repeatedly suggests that the exboyfriend's tip was unreliable because it was motivated by anger,
hostility or revenge. Br. of App. at 21-22. Defendant's
assertions lack record support and/or legal analysis and should
not be considered here. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297
(Utah 1986) (assertions of error that are unsupported by the
record or relevant authority not ordinarily considered on
appeal); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This
Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record.").
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has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is
engaged in criminal activity).
Further, approximately nine days prior to the warrant's
issuance, police observed a vehicle at Blomquist's residence
belonging to Linda Iorg (BR. 10) (see Addendum A).

Iorg's house

had been the subject of a search warrant for drugs in 1989, which
search lead to the arrest of Iorg's son on several charges of
drug distribution.
2.

Id.

Criminal History

The defendants' criminal histories provided additional,
independent corroboration of the informants' allegations.

A

check of defendant's criminal history revealed a a history of
drug related arrests in 1988-89 (BR. 11) (see Addendum A ) .
Blomquist's criminal history revealed a prior drug related
conviction in 1984. Id.
In United States v. Harris, the United States Supreme
Court considered the corroborative purposes of a suspect's
criminal reputation in a search warrant affidavit.
581-83 (1971).

4 03 U.S. 573,

The Court made clear that while a suspect's

"reputation, standing

alone,

was insufficient" to establish

probable cause; reputation was relevant to the probable cause
determination "when supported by other information."

Id. at 583.

Accordingly, the Court declined to interpret its prior cases as
prohibiting the use of such "probative information."

Id.

Rather, the Court concluded that it was entirely proper for a
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magistrate to rely upon the affiant's knowledge of a suspect's
reputation in assessing probable cause.

Id.

We cannot conclude that a policeman's
knowledge of a suspect's reputation something that policemen frequently know and
a factor that impressed such a "legal
technician" as Mr. Justice Frankfurter - is
not a "practical consideration of everyday
life" upon which an officer (or a magistrate)
may properly rely in assessing the
reliability of an informant's tip.
Id.

See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271 (discussed in Harris, wherein

Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority, held that information
"that [Jones] was a known user of narcotics made the charge (drug
trafficking) against him much less subject to sceptism than would
be such a charge against one without such a history")).
appellate court's have similarly held.

Utah's

See e.g. Bailey, 675 P.2d

at 1204, 1206 (police verification of Bailey's prior convictions
for burglary and auto theft enhanced reliability of confidential
informant's allegation that Bailey was involved in current
burglary and theft); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App.
1993) (confidential informant's allegations of suspects'
involvement in drug trafficking found to "mesh" with affiant
officer's knowledge of suspects' history of narcotic related
convictions and arrests); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385
(1991) (affidavit held to sufficiently establish named
informant's reliability where informant accurately detailed
Buford's prior criminal history of illegal drug use and sale).12
12

Accord Commonwealth v. Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1243,
45-46 (Mass. 1993) (defendant's 1978 narcotic conviction held
corroborative of informant's tip concerning defendant's
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But Cf. Viqh, 871 P.2d at 1031; State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952,
956 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (all overlooking
corroborative nature of suspect's criminal history and holding
criminal history not properly part of probable cause
determination).
C.

Current Probable Cause

Defendant disputes that the foregoing information
supports a finding of current probable cause.

She complains both

about the seven months between the initial incriminating tip and
the issuance of a search warrant, and about the relevance of her
prior drug related arrests.

Due, however, to the significant

fact that the search warrant was sought and executed on the very
day defendant was suspected to have delivered a load of
controlled substances to Blomquist's residence, defendant's
staleness challenge must fail.
As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court,
Staleness issues usually arise when a
significant lapse of time occurs between the
discovery of information suggesting that
involvement in drug trafficking scheme); Malcolm v. State, 550
A.2d 670, 671, 675 (Md. 1988) (suspect's 1980 narcotic conviction
held to corroborate informant's allegations of drug trafficking);
State v. Amerman 581 A.2d 19, 30-31 (Md. App. 1990) (threefold
purpose for including suspect's criminal history in search
warrant affidavit is to: 1) demonstrate suspect's tendency to
engage in related criminality; 2) independently corroborate
informant's allegations of suspect's involvement in related
offense; 3) demonstrate ongoing nature of suspect's involvement
in continuous criminal enterprise); People v. Keller, 505
N.Y.S.2d 802, 806-07 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1986) (arson suspect's prior
arson arrests deemed relevant consideration in determining
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant).
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evidence of the crime can be found at a
particular locale and the magistrate's
finding of probable cause or the execution of
the warrant. The concern is whether so much
time has passed that there is no longer
probable cause to believe that the evidence
is still at the targeted locale.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).

Defendant fails to demonstrate any such significant

lapse of time in this case.
Police first began receiving reports of Blomquist's
involvement in drug trafficking in September 1992 (BR. 11) (see
Addendum A) . Five months later, an anonymous informant ri'ovided
additional details incriminating defendant, including her ongoing
and biweekly trips to Nevada to purchase controlled substances.
Id.

On March 3, 1993, approximately nine days before the warrant

was sought, police observed the lorg vehicle (persons known to be
involved in controlled substances), at Blomquist's residence (BR.
10) (see Addendum A).

One day later, on March 4, 1993, Sergeant

Blackhurst heard from yet another anonymous informant who
reported that Blomquist expected defendant to deliver the next
"load11 on or about March 10, 1993 (BR. 11) (see Addendum A) .
Then, on March 11, 1993, police observed defendant's Corvette at
Blomquist's residence (BR. 10) (see Addendum A).

With the

foregoing information set forth in an affidavit, Sergeant
Blackhurst sought a search warrant that very morning (BR. 13) see
Addendum A ) .

Because defendant cannot show a significant lapse

of time between the observation of her Corvette at Blomquist's
residence and the warrant's issuance, defendant's staleness
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challenge fails. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260.

See also Singleton,

854 P.2d at 1017-18, 1021 (approving search warrant obtained
approximately 5 weeks after receipt of most recent incriminating
evidence) .13
Further, the affidavit alleges more than just an
isolated incident of criminality.

United States v. Johnson, 461

F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) ("where the affidavit properly
recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less
significant" to the determination of current probable cause).
Rather, the affidavit sets forth an ongoing pattern of criminal
activity; particularly, defendant's biweekly drug runs to Las
Vegas.

As acknowledged by this Court, drug trafficking is widely

recognized as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal
enterprise.

Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 (citing, United States

v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that
drug distribution schemes "are the very paradigm of the
continuing enterprises for which courts have relaxed the temporal
13

Accord United States v. Rowel1. 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd
Cir. 1990) (continuous nature of narcotics conspiracies precludes
staleness challenge to affidavit based on approximate 18 month
delay between procuring informant's statements and obtaining
search warrant); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597
(1st Cir. 1985) (approving affidavit alleging defendants'
involvement in marijuana distribution one year earlier), vacated
on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); Gardner v. State, 567
A.2d 404, 410-411 (Del. 1989) (rejecting staleness challenge to
affidavit based on 10 month hiatus between anonymous tip alleging
defendant's drug activity and date search warrant was issued),
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990); State v. Grimshaw, 515 A.2d
1201, 1204 (N.H. 1986) (affirming probable cause determination
based on informant's allegation of defendant's drug possession
approximately seven months prior to affidavit).
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requirements of non-staleness"), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d. Cir.),
cert, denied, Marin v. United States, 493 U.S. 834 (1989)).
Accordingly, in addition to its corroborative purposes, see Part
B, supra, defendant's prior drug related arrests and Blomquist's
prior drug related conviction were properly used to demonstrate
that their involvement with controlled substances has been
continuous over the years and was likely ongoing at the time of
the warrant's execution.

State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 55-57

(Utah App. 1989) (approximately eight year old conviction for
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert,
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, a common
sense reading of Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit suggests that
there was probable cause to search defendant's person and
Corvette.

The trial court thus properly applied the highly

deferential standards of review in examining the magistrate's
determination of probable cause.

It correctly rejected

defendant's arguments that the information received from three
independent informants was not reliable and was also stale in
favor of the conclusion that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for determining that there was a fair probability that
evidence of the defendants' drug distribution scheme would be
found on her person and inside her Corvette.

Given the "Fourth

Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to
a warrant," Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, this Court should similarly
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conclude that the magistrate had sufficient foundation for
determining that probable cause existed.
POINT III
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT WAS
DEFECTIVE, POLICE EXERCISED GOOD FAITH
RELIANCE ON THE SEARCH WARRANT
Even if this Court were to conclude that Sergeant
Blackhurst's affidavit was for some reason inadequate, the
evidence seized would still be admissible under the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the trial court so ruled (R. 46),
see Addendum B.14
Leon avoids suppression of evidence seized pursuant to
a subsequently-invalidated search warrant, provided that officers
conducting the search believed in good faith the warrant was
valid.

Further, the Leon exception to suppression requires that

reliance on the defective warrant be objectively reasonable.
Only then is the seized evidence admissible:
In the absence of an allegation that the
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral
role, suppression is appropriate only if the
officers were dishonest or reckless in

14

Defendant did not develop a state constitutional
analysis of the good faith issue in the trial court, nor has she
done so on appeal. Therefore, in the event the Court deems it
necessary to reach this issue, the Court's analysis "must proceed
solely under federal constitutional law." State v. Horton, 848
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
1993). See State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 n.2 (Utah App.)
(Utah appellate courts "will not engage in a state constitutional
analysis unless a party briefs a different analysis under the
state constitution than that which flows from the federal
constitution."), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
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preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause.
Id. at 926.
Although defendant has not expressly challenged the
good faith of the officers relying on the warrant, she does
attempt to analogize the instant affidavit to that in State v.
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989) . The Droneburg
affidavit relied solely on information obtained from one
confidential informant.

Id. at 1303. Although the informant had

previously provided reliable information, his/her assertion was
vague and conclusory, consisting of the bare allegation that
controlled substances would be delivered to a residence in
Panguitch, Utah, between the hours of 2:00 and 4:00 a.m..
The affidavit was devoid of any corroborative information.

Id.
Id.

Because the Droneburg affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause" the State conceded "it was unreasonable for the
officer who prepared the affidavit to rely on a warrant issued on
the strength of it."

Id. at 1305.

The instant affidavit is distinguishable from the illfated Droneburg affidavit.

Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit set

forth mutually reinforcing and corroborating information gleaned
from three different informants, as well as significant
corroborative information obtained through independent police
investigation.

See Point 11(B), supra.

Even if Sergeant

Blackhurst's affidavit failed in some way to clearly articulate
probable cause, it was not so inadequate that police could not
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have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the search
warrant that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.
None of the facial deficiencies that negate objective good faith
exist here.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 926. Nor is this a case

wherein the issuing magistrate was mislead by knowingly or
recklessly false information, or otherwise failed to perform his
neutral and detached function.

Id.; State v. Horton, 848 P.2d

708, 711 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Consequently, any defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that
police "had no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant
was properly issued."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

Therefore, police

reliance on the warrant issued was objectively reasonable and the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by
excluding the challenged evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the
denial of the motion to suppress and affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ T day of November, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

LIAN DECKEI
Assistant Attorney General
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appellant, 3325 N. University Ave., Suite 200, Jamestown Square,
Clocktower Bldg., Provo, Utah
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35

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
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SEARCH WARRANT RETURN

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

'
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INVENTORY OF PROPERTY TAKEN FROM THE RESIDENCE 6F ROGER BLOMQUISTP
126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on
March 1 1 7 — » 9 t r i y
authority of within SEARCH WARRANT issued by JUDGE DIMMICK, Circuit
Court Judge, County of Utah, 1993.
1.

Small metal can with rolling papers, 2 baggies containing
marijuana, cigarette lighter and scissors.

2.

Razor blade, glass tube with white crystals, glass pipe,
rolled up in a white towel.

3.

Pill in cigarette cellophane.

4.

Cigarette cellophane with 3 brown pills.

5.

Scales, hemostats, pipe, wire, 3 plastic funnels and marijuana
seeds.

6.

Hemostat•

7.

Round red tin can containing wooden pipe, white pills in
cellophane.

8.

2 straws in Corvette passenger seat.

9.

Marijuana roach, in Corvette passenger seat.

10.

2 cigarette cellophane packages with marijuana seeds.

11.

Brown vial with white residue.

I, SGT. MIKE BLACKHURST, the police officer by whom this
warrant was executed, do swear that I have
and the above inventory contains a true
of all property taken by me on the said

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
1993.

'b

• * - vx ^.

JLO

CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199
Deputy County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84611
Telephone 801-370-8026
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE

;

IN THE MATTER OF
SEARCH WARRANT
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

:

THE STATE OF UTAH TO AHY POLICE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrate's
Endorsement

.-"'"

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me
this 11th day of March, 1993, that there
is probable cause to believe the following :

1. The property described below:

has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense or is
evidence of illegal conduct.
2. The property described below is most probably located
upon the person or at the premises also set forth below*
l^'
3. The person or entity in possession of the property is
a party to the alleged illegal conduct.
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons:
The persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edinfield. The
residence of the suspect(s), located at 126 South main Pleasant
Grove and surrounding curtledge and outbuildings. The residence is
more specifically described as a white stucco single family
dwelling on the West side of main street in Pleasant Grove facing
East. The residence has a dirt driveway of the North side and is
the first residence south of the intersection of 100 North main
street. There is a white brick unattached garage behind the
residence on the West side.
The suspects vehicle that is described as a 1981 Chevrolet
Corvette bearing Nevada License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is
registered to Linda Edinfield.

You are directed to search for the presence of controlled
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other
contraband associated with controlled substances.
THIS WARRANT HAY BE SERVED:
IN THE DAYTIME
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any seized evidence, identifying the place
where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FEOH THE DATE
OF ISSUANCE.
Dated this

4-

.day of 13^1992 at J//^^^>%.
Magistrate f ^ ^ A ^
f

J

•

^
" •
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CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

>
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,

-vs-

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF AND MOTION
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

y
)
)
>

IN THE MATTER OF A
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

STATE OF UTAH,

)
:
)

COUNTY OF UTAH

Case No.

SS.

1- MIKE BLACKHURST , Being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:

2. That I am a police officer for the Pleasant Grove
Police Department, Pleasant Grove,

Utah County, Utah,

3. That I have been employed as a Policeman for the past
twenty four years and that I am currently assigned to the Utah
County Narcotics Task force. I have received training from the Utah
State Police Officers Standards and Training Academy, the Utah Drug
academy,

and

the DEA drug

academy.

This training

covered

all

aspects of drug enforcement and included substance identification,
confidential informants, undercover operations, controlled buys,
undercover drug buys, drafting search warrants, executing search
warrants, and all other areas of drug enforcement.
1 have had experience in making undercover drug buys, writing and

their information, and conducting surveillance.

4. That in September of 1992, Detective Aundre Leavitt
recieved

information

from

a confidential

informant

that

Roger

Blomquist's was involved in the distribution and use of controlled
substances.

b. That this same confidential informant has supplied
information on as many as four individuals who were involved in the
distribution of controlled substances and that this information has
been proven to be reliable through other investigative methods.

fe. That on January 28th,

1993, your affiant received

information from an anonymous informant who said that that Linda
Edinfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, was driving to the
Las

Vegas

area

in

a

Tan

and

Brown

Chevrolete

Corvette.

The

anonymous informant stated that the reason for these trips was to
pick

up

controlled

substances

to

be

delivered

back

to

Roger

blomquist. These trips occur approximately every two weeks, and
that Linda carries a gun concealed in a compartment

behind her

seat.

7.

That

on

March

4th,

1993,

your

affiant

received

information from a different anonymous informant who stated that a
telephone conversation had been overheard in which Roger Blomquist
stated that Linda Edinfield would be delivering a load within the
next five to 6ix days.

8. That with the above information on March 4th, 1993,
surveillance was conducted at the residence of Roger Blomquist and
it was discovered that the Tan and Brown Corvette was not at the
residence. Periodic surveillance was conducted to watch for the
arrival of the Corvette and it did arrive on March ilth, 1993.

9. That during the periodic surveillance Sergeant Lee Fox
observed a vehicle parked at the Blomquist residence on March 3rd,
1993. This vehicle was bearing Utah License plate #942 BHN, and was
registered

to

Linda

Iorg.

Sergeant

Fox

recalled

that

he

had

conducted a serach warrant on the Iorg residence in 1989 wherein
the

son

of

Linda

Iorg

was

arres+rd

on

several

counts

of

distribution of controlled substance.

10. That a records check was conducted

on both Roger

Blomquist and his girlfriend Linda Edinfield. It was found that
Roger

Blomquist

substances

with

has
a

a

criminal

conviction

in

record
March

involving
of

1984.

It

controlled
was

also

discovered that there was a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest out
of the Pleasant Grove City Court.

11. That the records check of Linda Edinfield revealed
that

she has a criminal

charged

but

cocaine

in

never
1988,

substance in 1989.

history

convicted
and

two

with

counts

indicating
two
of

counts

that

she has been

of possession

possession

of

of

controlled

12. That the vehicle Linda Edinfield is driving is more
specifically
License

described as a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada

plate

#693

EPS.

The

vehicle

is

registered

to

Linda

Edinfield.

13. That the residence of Roger Blomquist is located at
126 South Main in Pleasant Grove and is more specifically described
as a white stucco single family dwelling on the West side of main
street in Pleasant Grove facing East. The residence has a dirt
driveway of the North side and is the first residence south of the
intersection

of 10(23 North main street. There is a white brick

unattached garage behind the residence on the West side.

14. That it is your affiants experience that subjects who
deal

in

associated

controlled

substance

wil

commonly

keep

other

items

with their drug business in their possession. These

items include drug paraphernalia,

buy/owe sheets,

scales, drug

money, or any other items that would facilitate their drug deals.

15. That it is your affiants experience that those who
deal in controlled substance will often conceal their drugs outside
of their residence upon the curtledge of their property.

16. That the materials sought by this application for a
search and seizure warrant are being held in violation of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act and are evidence of felonious drug crime,

wherefore, your affiant respectfully requests that the Court issue
its warrant for the search at any time of the day

of the residence

described above, and the person of the suspects, Roger Blomquist
and

Linda

Edinfield,

for

the

presence

therein

of

controlled

substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other
contraband associated with controlled substances.

^

—

MIKE BLACKHURST
AFFIANT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day p^flBrsh, 1993, at

11:3*

hrs.

r\

/mW^>>
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ADDENDUM B

FILED

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026

Fourth Judical District Court
of Utah County, St3te of Utah
CARMA p. SMITH, Clerk
'V

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BBaBBEEBssuDBsaBBisssasasssssassssxBasns^

STATE OF UTAH,

i

Jt

Plaintiff,
VS.

1

iE

ROGER A. BLOMQUIST, and
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD,

ii

•

ii • ii - — — - — — ~ — —

Case No. $31400386 FS
Case No.~~931000385~FS
Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant(s).
— ~ - — - —

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i

—

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park
presiding on the 26th day of August, 1993.

The Defendants were

present in person and represented by Attorney Shelden R. Carter.
The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, James
R. Taylor. The Court having heard the evidence in this matter and
issued a Memorandum Decision does make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In September of 1992, a detective of the Narcotics

Enforcement Team received information from a trusted and reliable
confidential informant that Defendant Roger Blomquist was involved
in the distribution and use of controlled substances.
2.

In January of 1993, a separate anonymous informant

provided information that Linda Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger

DO

Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown Chevrolet
Corvette to obtain controlled substances to deliver back to Roger
Blomquist.
3. The anonymous informant said the trips occurred every two
weeks and that Edenfield carried a gun concealed in a compartment
behind her seat.
4.
third

In March of 1993, officers received information from a

informant

who

claimed

to

have

overheard

a

telephone

conversation in which Blomquist stated that Edenfield would be
delivering a load within the next five to six days.
5. After receiving the information on March 4, 1993, officers
began surveillance of the residence of Blomquist and discovered
that the tan and brown Corvette was not at the residence.
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until March 10, 1993.
During the period of surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda
Iorg was seen parked at the home.
7.

Iorg was arrested

substances in 1989.

on several

counts

of

controlled

Roger Blomquist was also found to have had a

criminal record involving controlled substances with a conviction
in March of 1984.
8. Officers determined that an active warrant for the arrest
of Roger Blomquist existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court.
9*

The name Linda Edenfield was also checked and it was

determined that there were several narcotics related convictions

2

appearing on the record.
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada license number 693EPS
was registered to Linda Edenfield.
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the information obtained by the
officers was put together in an affidavit and taken to Judge Dimick
of the Orem Circuit Court who executed a search warrant authorizing
search of the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette registered to
Linda Edenfield, the person of Linda Edenfield, and the person of
Roger Blomquist.

A copy of the search warrant and affidavit are

attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced surveillance of the
Blomquist residence.

Officer Blackhurst was in the process of

acquiring the search warrant described above. While the Blomquist
residence was under surveillance the Defendants, Linda Edenfield
and Roger Blomquist, left the residence and entered a vehicle owned
by Defendant Blomquist.
13.
a.m.

The Blomquist vehicle was stopped sometime around 10:30

Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was

detained briefly until officers received information that the
search warrant had been signed.
14.

Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to the

Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield was searched
pursuant to the warrant.
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the Edenfield vehicle

3

were searched until the search warrant was appropriately executed
by Judge Dimick.
16 • The purse of Defendant Edenfield was with her when the
vehicle was stopped and taken with her to the police station. The
purse was part of her person and appropriately searched pursuant to
the search warrant.
17.

The stop of Roger Blomquist and the execution of the

arrest warrant and execution of the search warrant were essentially
contemporaneous.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Under the totality of the circumstances analysis the facts
as established in the affidavit in support of the search warrant
established adequate probable cause to support the search warrant
issued.

Information from separate sources was corroborative and

consistent providing a sufficient basis for the Magistrate to
conclude that there was fair probability that the evidence sought
would be found in the car, in the house, or on the person of the
individuals described.
2.

The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the temporary

detention of the Defendants prior to the physical arrival of the
search warrant was appropriate because of the mobility of the

4

Defendants and the likelihood that they may have had evidence upon
their person.
3.

All officers involved in this operation acted in a good

faith attempt to comply with the Rules of Evidence and Constitution
of the United States.

Officers acted reasonably and prudently to

prevent the loss or destruction of expected evidence without
inappropriate intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects.
4.

The initial seizure of the person of Linda Edenfield was

lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
5.

The method employed by the officers was reasonable and

employed in a reasonable manner in that the officers had an obvious
and legitimate concern when the suspects left the home and entered
a vehicle that evidence would leave with them. The immediate stop
and detention without further search until they had received
information that the search warrant being sought at the present
time was executed was appropriate. No lesser intrusion would have
preserved the evidence.

No more intrusive action was undertaken

until the fact that the warrant had been signed was confirmed.
6.

Police officers had received a valid search warrant based

upon evidence independent of the stop and detention of Edenfield.
Even if the search took place before the warrant was obtained the
fact that a warrant was obtained made discovery of the evidence
inevitable and the evidence should not be suppressed even if it
were to be determined by this Court that the search took place
5

before execution of the warrant.
DATED this

/j/

day of October, 1993

BOYD L. PARI
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SHELDEN R. CARTER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

4o

ADDENDUM C

4™ DISTRICT CCJ.Vf
STATE O r I'TAri

Nov 2

j^OS

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 931400385 & 386
DATE: November 2, 1993

vs.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST

CLERK: LHH
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling.
Defendants contend the case of State v. Potter. 221 Ut. Adv. Reports 29, compels this
court to rule differently regarding Defendants' Motion to Suppress. This court issued its
Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on September 15, 1993.
The court having read the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Response and the case of State v. Potter, and being fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:
RULING
(1) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling is denied. This court does not
believe Potter alters the existing law in this state regarding search warrants.
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
cc: Utah County Attorney
Shelden Carter, Esq.

O F F I C E OF THE A T T O R N E Y

GENERAL

Utah Court of Appeals

NOV 1 5 1994
Marilyn M.Branch
Clerk of the Court
JAN G R A H A M
ATTORNEY GENERAL
PALMER DEPAULIS
Director of Public Policy & Communications

REED RICHARDS
Chief Deputy Attorney General

CAROL CLAWSON
Solicitor General

November 15, 1994

Marilyn Branch
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: State v. Edenfield, Case No. 940368-CA,
and State v. Blomguist, Case No. 940369-CA.
Dear Ms. Branch:
Since the filing of the State's responsive briefs in
these matters, pertinent and significant authority has come to my
attention concerning the issue set out in the State's Edenfield
brief at Point 11(B) (2), pp. 26-28, and in the State's Blomguist
brief at Point 1(B)(2), pp. 19-21. The State cites as
supplemental authority, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66
(Utah App. 1987).
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to
rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sincerely,
Marian Decker
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Shelden R. Carter
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